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INTRODUCTION A BRIEF GLANCE AT
ATTORNEYS' FEES AFTER ALYESKA
Hon. James L. Oakes*
When the Supreme Court decIded Alyeska Pipeline Servfce
Co. v. Wilderness SOCtety 1 reaffirmmg the Amencan Rule that a
prevailing party IS generally not entitled to attorneys fees, 2 it
merely altered the parameters of litigation over attorneys fees; it
did not end the controversy ThIS sympOSIUm addresses many of
the Issues that remam. ThIS mtroductIon IS mtended to prOVIde a
background to, and delineate some of, those Issues without pre
empting the authors of the commentanes that follow
The Court m Alyeska was disturbed by a growmg tendency of
the lower federal courts to permit an award of attorneys fees to
partIes vmdicatmg the public mterest" by actmg as pnvate attor
neys general."3 The "pnvate attorney general" concept had found
perhaps its most eXpanSIOnIst expressIOn m La Raza Untda v.
Volpe 4 In that case the distnct court, after enJommg a hIghway
construction project for failure to comply with statutory housmg
relocation reqUIrements, awarded attorneys fees agamst the Cali
fornIa HIghway and Public Works Departments as well as agamst
the ChIef Highway Engmeer m hIS mdividual and representative
capacity The deCISIon may have envIsaged:
[A]n era of the law s developmg its own mternal self-sustammg
mstituhon meetmg the SOCIal demand for law aChvely to sub
serve the public mterest m enVIronmental protechon--creatmg
m three steps (1) a public nght, (2) persons (or objects) with
U.S. Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
1. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
2. The Court In Alyeska gave speCIal heed to an article by Professor John
Dawson, 421 U.S. at 258 (citing Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney
Fees from Funds, 87 HARV L. REv 1597 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dawson IJ). See
also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients m Public Interest Litigation, 88
HARV L. REv 849 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dawson Ill.
3. See 421 U.S. at 270 nA6 (citations omitted).
4. 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973). Interest
Ingly even after Alyeska, California as
matter of state law appears to permit the
award of fees for the Vindication of state constitutional nghts under
pnvate attor
ney general" concept. See Serrano
Pnest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1977).
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standing to assert that nght, and (3) provIding the means for
paymg the lawyers and techmcal experts who do the work to as
sert the nght. Thus evolves democracy lit thIs wondrous law
onented socIety of ours. 5

Alyeska has effectively ended the vlSlonary fanciful, or rather
fnghtenmg--depending on the VIewer s perspectIve-scheme of
thmgs foreshadowed by La Raza Umda. But it has left open four
doors6 for the award of attorneys fees.
First, Congress may authonze the award of attorneys fees by
statute. 7 Many statutes authonzmg these awards predate Alyeska. 8
New statutes have been adopted, 9 perhaps the most Important of
whICh IS the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976. 10
Since Alyeska, at least four major questions have been litigated un
der these statutes: (1) Whether they permit the award of fees m
connectIOn with litigation commenced pnor to statutory enactment;
(2) whether, when statutes provIde for awards to the prevailing
party m the tnal court's discretion, presumptive rules should dif
ferentIate between prevailing plamtiffs and defendants; (3) whether
attorneys fees are an element of costs or of damages. If they are an
element of damages, then postjudgment mterest IS allowable; (4)
whether the statutes permit fees to legal organlZatIons, such as le
gal aId SOCIetIes and some public mterest" law firms, that are par
tIally funded by the government.
Followmg the Supreme Court's mterpretatIon of the Emer
gency School AId Act of 1972,11 subsequently applied m respect to
5. Oakes, EnVironmental Litigation: Current Developments and Suggestions
for the Future, 5 CONN. L. REV 531, 538 (1973).
6. What I call the "fourth door allows the award of attorneys fees In federal
diversity cases where the applicable state law permits it. But thIS exception IS often
redundant with the Alyeska conclusIOn, SInce most states themselves follow the re
stnctive Amencan Rule. 421 U.S. at 259 n.31. As such, and as otherwIse of little
moment, thIS door IS not discussed In thIS Introduction.
7 421 U.S. at 263 (1975).
8. See 421 U.S. at 260 n.33; Oakes, Awarding Attorneys Fees After Alyeska, In
2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 598 (1976).
9. See Solovy & Barnard, Attorneys Fees In Commerc,al and Civil Rights Ac
tions, In 2 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 760 (1979) (list
mcluding newer statutes); NATIONAL LAw JOURNAL, Oct. 2, 1978, at 8.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See generally LIpson, Beyond Alyeska-;/udiclal
Response to the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act, 22 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 243 (1978);
Malson, In Response to Alyeska-The Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act of
1976,21 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 430 (1977); Note, The Civil Rights Attorney Fee Awards
Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN S L. REV 562 (1978); Comment, Civil Rights Attorney
Fees Awards Act of 1976,34 WASH. & LEE L. REV 205 (1977).
11. See Bradley
School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974) (interpreting 20 U.S.C. §
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the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees Awards Act of 1976,12 most lower
federal courts have allowed the award of fees m cases commenced
pnor to the statutory enactment. 13
The Supreme Court has answered the questIon whether differ
ent standards should govern the award of attorneys fees to a pre
vailing party plamtiff or a prevailing party defendant, by endorsmg
a presumptIve award to plamtiffs. The Court, however, reqUIres
more specific findings for an award to defendants. Thus, III Newman
v. Piggte Park Enterpnses, 14 the Court held that, under the pre
vailing party language of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a
prevailing plamtiff should ordinarily recover an attorney s fee un
less specIal cIrcumstances would render [that] award unJust."15 The
prevailing plamtiff standard was followed m Northcross v. Board of
Educatron,16 an educatIonal CIvil nghts case, and m Albennarle Pa
per Co. v. Moody 17 a title VII case. In Chnstiansburg Garment
Co. v. Equal Employment Opportumty CommlsslOn,18 however
the Court applied a different test to a defendant prevailing under
title VII. ReJectmg both the prevailing plamtiff standard and the
suggestIon that a defendant should recover only when the actIon
was brought m bad faith, the Court held that fees may be awarded
upon a finding that the plamtiffs action was fnvolous, unreason
able, or without foundatIon, even though not brought m subjective
bad faith. "19 Presumably a SImilar standard would apply to other
comparable statutes.
The thIrd questIon, whether fees are costs or damages, has
1617 (1976) (repealed effective Sept. 30, 1979, and replaced by the identical 20
U.S.C.A. § 3205 (West Cum. Supp. 1979»). See also Walker, Recovery of Attorney
Fees In Civil Rights Litigation, 39 ALA. LAW 93 (1978).
12. See Hutto Finney 437 U.S. 678, 694 n.23 (1978) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1976».
13. Holley v. LavIne, Nos. 79-7182, 79-7190, 79-7207, slip op. at 3725 (2d Cir.
July 13, 1979); Gagne v. Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48
U.S.L.W 3047 (Oct. 1, 1979) (No. 78-1888); Pickett
Milam, 579 F.2d 1118, ll20
(8th Cir. 1978); Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1977),
rev d on other grounds, 99 S.Ct. 1355 (1979).
14. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per cunam).
15. ld. at 402.
16. 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per cunam) (construIng the Emergency School
Aid Act of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1601-19 (1976».
17 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (dictum) (§ 706(k) of Title VIl of Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976»; see Chnstiansburg Garment Co.
EEOC,
434 U.S. 412,417 (1978) (dictum). See also, e.g., Carnon v. Yeshiva Univ 535 F.2d
722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976).
18. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
19. ld. at 421.
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been answered differently by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth and Ninth Circuit. 2o The fourth questIon, whether a state
funded plamtiff's attorney IS entitled to fees, has receIved varymg
answers from different courts, with most favonng the award. 21
Recent cases have held that even where a nonconstitutIonal
claIm IS mvolved,22 attorneys fees may be awarded from state de
fendants despite the eleventh amendment, at least when Congress
IS exercIsmg its fourteenth amendment sectIon 5 powers. 23 But
several Important Issues remam unresolved, mcluding the use of
pendent Junsdictlon to brmg nonconstitutlonal clrums withm the
purvIew of a congressIOnal act, the standards pertrulllng to the ex
erCIse of the court's discretIOn thereunder; the applicability of an
act to government offiCIals and the United States itself, whether as
losmg or prevailing24 partIes; and compensatIon for legal servIces
rendered m admIlllstratlve proceedings,25 all of whIch are dis
cussed m depth withm the pages of thIS symposmm.
20. Compare Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F.2d 1316, 1321-23 (5th Cir.
1978) (holding fees to be costs, not pennitting award of Interest thereon) with Per
kins
Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1973) (treating attorneys fees as
damages, pennitting award of mterest). The Carpa case appears the better reasoned
In light of the cost" language In the pnvate suit proVISIOn of the Clayton Act. 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 345 (2d Cir. 1979), cen. granted,
21. See, e.g., Gagne
48 U.S.L.W 3047 (Oct. 1, 1979) (No. 78-1888) (attorneys fees reduced to reflect pub
lic funding); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U Inc., 578 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1978); Perez
Rodnguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1978).
Maher, 594 F.2d 336, 342 (2d Cir. 1979), cen. granted, 48
22. Gagne
U.S.L.W 3047 (Oct. 1, 1979) (No. 78-1888).
23. ld. (retroactive relief); Fitzpatnck
Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559, 571-72 (2nd Cir.
1975), aff'd In part, rev d In part, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (prospective relief). See also
Hutto v. Finney 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 76-77 (1st Cir.
1978); Bond
Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174-75 (7th Cir. 1977), cen. demed, 438 U.S.
916 (1978).
24. See Comment, United States as Prevailing Defendant m Title VII Actions:
Attorneys Fees and Costs, 66 GEO. L.J. 899 (1978).
25. Carey v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., allowed recovery m title VII suit
for servIces rendered m successful state adminIstrative proceedings, under the 'fed
eral mandate [m title VII] of accommodation to state action.
598 F.2d 1253, 1257,
cen. granted, 48 U.S.L.W 3235 (Oct. 9, 1979) (No. 79-192) (quoting VoutSlS
Umon
CarbIde Corp., 452 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1971), cen. demed, 406 U.S. 918 (1972».
Parker
Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977), pennitted award of fees In title
VII case covermg servlCes in pnor federal admlmstrative proceedings. But cf.
Fitzgerald
United States Civil Serv Comm n, 554 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dis
allowed award under Veterans Preference Act where no express statutory proVISIOn
for fees was found. 5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1976». See also Note, Civil Rights-Title
VII-Recovery of Attorneys Fees for ServIces Rendered In Connection with Admm
Istrative Proceedings, 24 WAYNE L. REv 1409, 1419-20 (1978).
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A second door to the award of attorneys fees left open by
Alyeska IS the old equitable common fund" or "common benefit"
doctnne. 26 Alyeska leaves unclear how wIde thIS openmg IS. The
text of Mr JustIce White s opmlon reads "benefit" as broadly as
the language of Trustees v. Greenough 27 permits, refemng to a
"power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property or a
party preservmg or recovenng a fund for the benefit of others
.,
attorneys fees, from the fund or
to recover hIS costs, mcluding
property
or directly from the other partIes enJoymg the bene
fit."28 A later footnote, however, narrows the constructIon to classes
of beneficianes whICh are small m number and easily Identifiable,
and where the benefits could be traced with some accuracy so that
the costs could be shifted to those truly benefitmg. 29
While we may only speculate, the Court's recent declSlon to
reVIew Van Gernert v. Boemg Co. 30 may reflect a desrre to clarify
the scope of the common benefit" doctnne. In Van Gernert, a suc
cessful class actIOn suit on behalf of nonconvertmg debenture hold
ers,31 the court of appeals allowed the attorneys an award based on
the total fund recovered even though not all the members of the
class had filed clrums for recovery The dissent argued that non
26. See generally Mills v. ElectriC Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1969) (awarding
Intenm attorneys fees to minority stockholders who, sUing to set aside their corpora
tion merger, established VIOlation of ~ 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 14a-9 thereunder pertaining to proxy disclosures. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976»;
Sprague
Tacomc Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.) (trust benefiCiary
establishing own nght to lien on trust fund sale may obtain attorneys fees out of pro
ceeds; case IS often cited for dicta, based upon the broad power of equity as applied
through stare deCISIS, where the "fund IS for all practical purposes created for the
benefit of others. Id. at 167); Central R.R. & Bankmg Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116
(1885) (lawyer may recover attorneys fees not only from hiS clients but also from
other parties benefiting from hiS efforts to establish lien on property); Trustees v.
Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882) (party brlngmg suit to rescue trust fund and restore
it to its proper purposes may recover fees from the fund as means of enforcmg con
tribution to hiS attorneys fees from hiS cobeneficlanes of the fund); Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cere. dented, 320 U.S. 751 (1943) (attor
neys fees recoverable under unjust ennchment theory In action under § 16(b) of
1934 Act, although no express proVISIOn proVides such, and express proVISIOns do ex
ISt under §§ 9(e) and 18(a) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976»; Dawson I,
supra note 2; Dawson II, supra note 2.
27. 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
28. 421 U.S. at 257 (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 264 n.39.
30. 590 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cere. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979)
(No. 78-1327) (Van Gernert IV).
31. 520 F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cere. dented, 423 U.S. 947 (1975) (Van Gernert I).
See also Van Gernert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Gernert II).
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claImmg members were not clients of the attorneys for the named
class, if they were even partIes to the suit,32 and that the award
was, therefore, a "lawyer s wmdfall. "33 Given the concern ex
pressed by some Judges over possible abuse of class actions by law
yers,34 one may not safely predict the outcome of Van Gernert. 35
Regardless of how Van Gernert IS decIded, senous problems
remaIn m determmmg the amount of fees to be awarded, and to
whom the award extends, m common benefit" cases, whICh IS a
subject covered m thIS symposmm. Some of the decIded cases de
lineate the problems, mcluding when negotiations for attorneys
fees should be conducted,36 the factors to be used m determmmg
the amount of the fees,37 and whether discovery of defense coun
sel's hours IS appropnate as a baSIS for companson with plaIntiff's
time. 38
The thIrd door to recovery of attorneys fees left open m
Alyeska-for vexatious, bad faith, wanton, or oppreSSIve action by
the losmg party39_not only has a longstanding hIstory of Supreme
Court approval,40 but enJoys faIrly frequent usage. Since Alyeska,
32. 590 F.2d at 442, 443 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). But see 590 F.2d at
440 n.15 (Kaufman, C.J.) ("the class [Is] the attorney client for all practical pur
poses") (emphasIs In ongmal) (citing Note, Developments In the Law: Class Actions,
89 HARV L. REV 1318, 1592-97 (1976)). The majority specifically stated that it did
not express any view as to the appropriate ultimate disposition of the unclaimed re
mamder of the fund. ld. at 440 n.17. The dissent was completely silent on thiS Issue.
But see Van Gernert Boemg Co., 553 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1977) (Van Gernert II).
33. 590 F.2d at 443. The dissent also argued that smce the common fund"
doctrine was created to prevent unjust enrichment, there can be no recovery since
no benefit IS conferred without clrum and knowmg acceptance of the benefit. Id.
at 444.
34. E.g., Van Gernert v. Boemg Co., 573 F.2d 733, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1978) (Van
Gernert Ill).
35. Irrespective of that outcome, the author stands by hiS differentiation be
tween attorneys fees and disbursements, as set forth In the dissent to the panel
oplmon m Van Gernert Ill. Van Gernert v. Boemg Co., 573 F.2d 733, 738 (1978).
36. Prandim v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977) (after mam class
action IS settled, to aVOid possible conflict of Interests).
37. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977) (numerous
factors detennlnmg whether baSIC hourly fee should be mcreased or decreased);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (twelve fac
tors for same purpose). See also ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, .Dis
clplinary Rule 2-107. A sophisticated diSCUSSIOn of the cases dealing with the criteria
for the award of attorneys fees appears In Solovy & Barnard, supra note 9, at 774.
38. See Rabb, Attorney Fees In Civil Rights Actions, m 2 CURRENT PROB
LEMS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE 865 (1979) (list of cases).
39. 421 U.S. at 258-59.
40. E.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rei. International Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maler Brewmg Co., 386 U.S.
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thIS exceptIon to the AmerIcan rule has been used to award attor
neys fees m a class action suit agamst a hospital and local mavor
refusmg to pennit abortIons,41 m a prIsoners rIghts suit,42 m a
housmg discnmmatIon case,43 m a teacher s discharge suit,44 and
most recently m a title VII case. 45 Of course, if a suit IS only m
substantial but not m bad faith, fees will not be awarded under thIs
rule. 46 One distrIct court, m a novel case, has assessed a $50,000
award agamst an unsuccessful plamtiff's lawyer and hIs law finn for
a suit that the court found baseless. 47 The questIon remams
whether the vexatIous or bad faith conduct must occur m the han
dling of the litIgation itself, as some courts hold,48 or may mclude
an opponent's conduct whICh necessitates the litIgation, as held by
others.49 The author tends to support the first of these two theones
m the belief that oppreSSIve conduct leading to the litIgatIon can
714, 718 (1967); Vaughan
Atkmson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); Toledo Scale Co.
v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923).
41. Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 546-48 (8th Cir. 1975), rev d on other
grounds, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per cunam). See also Cormst v Richland Parish School
Bd., 517 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975) (per cunam) (case mvolvIng raCially discnm
matory finngs remanded for possible award of fees based on bad faith).
42. Miller Carson, 401 F Supp. 835, 845-57 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
Runck, 402 F Supp. 863, 870 (S.D. OhIO 1975).
43. Clemons
44. Morns v. Board of Educ., 401 F Supp. 188,215 (D. Del. 1975).
Martinez, 48 U.S.L.W 2089 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 1979).
45. Copeland
MiSSIOn Broadcasting Co., 523 F.2d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 1975)
46. Wimberly
(no attorneys fees for unsuccessful IndiVidual pnvate action by veteran for re
employment follOWIng military discharge); United States
Ford Motor Co., 522
F.2d 962, 967 (6th Cir. 1975) (no attorneys fees for defending agamst employer who
sought Injunction that was ruled msubstantial and with little merit, though not fnvo
lous); Hallmark Climc v. North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, 519 F.2d 1315,
1317 (4th Cir. 1975) (no attorneys fees agamst Human Resources Department as part
of executive department; none agamst IndiViduals because no bad faith when at
tempting to Implement new statutes responsive to new constitutional doctnne);
Hander v. San JacInto Jumor College, 519 F.2d 273, 280-81 (5th Cir. 1975) (no attor
neys fees for wrongfully discharged public Jumor college teacher m VIOlation of
fourteenth amendment SInce VIOlation does not fall withIn the four Alyeska excep
tions); Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F Supp. 782, 799 (N.D. Tex. 1975), rev d on other
grounds, 551 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1977), rev d on other grounds, 437 U.S. 535 (1978)
(no attorneys fees for successful constitutional challenge of city at large method of
electing city council members smce there was no bad faith); Walther & Cie
U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 397 F Supp. 937, 946 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (no attorneys fees smce
defendant' failure to consummate settlement agreement m timely manner did not
amount to bad faith).
47. Nemeroff Abelson, 469 F Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (appeal pending).
48. Straub V VOlsman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3rd Cir. 1976); Tze Zing Yao
v. W.E. Hutton & Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) ~ 96,039
at 91,652 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
49. Bogart v. Unified School Dist. No. 298, 432 F Supp. 895, 906 (D. Kan.
1977); LeWIS v. Texaco, 418 F Supp. 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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ordinarily be compensated for through the doctnne of punitive
damages. Although logIc may permit the award of attorneys fees,
even as authonzed by statute, it may nevertheless, be outweIghed
In a gIVen case In whIch the punitive damages have been substan
tIal. 50
These three Alyeska exceptions by themselves suggest that the
editors of the Western New England Law Revtew have chosen an
Increasmgly Important tOPIC for thIS symposIUm, and one of
grOWIng Interest to lawyers and clients alike. The skyrocketIng cost
of litigatIon alone makes the tOPIC alive. Statutory proposals such as
The Equal Access to Justice Act,51 whIch would proVIde citIZens
and small bUSInesses reImbursement In prevailing litigation with
the government, make the tOpIC even more SIgnificant for the fu
ture. After twenty years of practice and ten years of observation
from the bench, I am well aware that the allocatIon and amount of
attorneys fees and costs have tremendous Impact not only on the
bnngIng and settling of litIgatIon but also on achIeVIng real JustIce.
I am honored to have been chosen to write thIS survey of the prob
lem, a problem for whIch Alyeska set some parameters but did not
resolve.

50. See Zarcone
Perry 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979) (attorneys fees were disallowed In part because the punitive damages
award had been suffiCient).
51. S. 265, 96th Congo 1st Sess. (1979) (passed United States Senate on July 31,
1979 pending with United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judi
ciary).

